During the Great Recession, despite the large fall in output, the fall in inflation was modest. This is known as the missing deflation puzzle. In this paper, 
Introduction
New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models have become an important tool for monetary policy analysis and forecasting at central banks and other policy institutions around the world. However, the failure of these models to forecast the behaviour of inflation and other key macroeconomic variables during the Great Recession has been interpreted as evidence against this class of models. Two important papers in this regard are Ball and Mazumder (2011) and Hall (2011) . Ball and Mazumder make their point by forecasting inflation during Great Recession using the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), which determines inflation in the models. They find that the NKPC estimated from 1960 to 2007 cannot forecast inflation during the Great Recession. Hall criticises the NKPC on the basis that it fails to provide an explanation for the "missing deflation" puzzle. Missing deflation is characterised as higher levels of actual inflation during the Great Recession than the NKPC predicts. The NKPC relates inflation and economic activity. Given the depth and duration of the recession caused by the 2008 financial crisis, the NKPC would predict severe deflation. However, this did not happen and inflation remained positive. This paper offers an explanation for the missing deflation puzzle. We argue that the reason for stable inflation was the increasing intermediate materials prices during the Great Recession. When we plot intermediate materials price inflation and Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) inflation for goods, both the series track each other very closely (see Figure 1) . The correlation between the two series is 0.8. Moreover, the co-movement between intermediate materials price inflation and 2 PCE goods price inflation is stable for the entire period: before and after the Great Recession. Both the series experienced a sharp fall at the start of the crisis which was followed by a simultaneous recovery.
To test our argument, we use a modified version of the Smets and Wouters (2007) (henceforth SW) model. Specifically, we reformulate the SW model to include the financial frictions mechanism in Bernanke et al. (1999) (henceforth BGG) and to account for the changes in intermediate materials prices. Further, we remove the price mark-up shocks in the model and following Aoki (2001 ), De Walque et al. (2006 and Huang and Liu (2005) , consider supply-side shocks that arise from changes in relative intermediate materials prices. Let us briefly explain these additions to the SW model.
To incorporate intermediate prices in the SW model, we divide production into two sectors. In one of the sectors intermediate materials are produced and in the other finished goods. We assume that intermediate materials are used as a factor input for the production of finished goods, while a small proportion of the intermediate materials is also needed to convert finished goods into final consumption goods. Prices in both sectors are set according to Calvo (1983) pricing. Inflation in both the sectors depend on sector-specific current and future marginal costs. We further assume that prices in the intermediate materials sector are also subject to a sector-specific shock. This shock is meant to capture exogenous factors affecting intermediate prices (e.g. Arab Spring). As a result, inflation in the intermediate goods sector depends on future marginal cost and the sector specific shock.
Turning to the second addition, as is well-known (see, e.g., Christiano et al. 3 (2014) , henceforth CMR), the BGG mechanism models the idiosyncratic uncertainty faced by entrepreneurs. The common assumption is that the volatility of crosssectional idiosyncratic uncertainty fluctuates over time. This measure of volatility is referred to as risk. In line with CMR, we assume that the risk shock process has both unanticipated (or stochastic) and anticipated (or news) components. Several recent papers (e.g. CMR and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2012)) show that accounting for the anticipated component improves the empirical performance of the model significantly.
The rest of the model is exactly the same as that in SW.
Next, we estimate the new model for US data using Bayesian techniques. Finally, we compare the dynamics of inflation, output and marginal cost from our model with and without the intermediate input shocks over the period of the Great Recession.
Our results suggest that intermediate materials prices played an important role in keeping inflation stable during most of the Great Recession. Importantly, our model achieves this in a way that is consistent with the micro-evidence on prices.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. In our model, since intermediate materials are an input in production, marginal cost depends also on intermediate materials prices. During the Great Recession, intermediate prices were increasing. As a result, during the Great Recession, the marginal cost in our model remains significantly high. Stable marginal costs, relative to that suggested by the SW, helps the model in explaining stable inflation dynamics without requiring large degree of price rigidities. To put it differently, the new model suggests that the increase in intermediate prices during the Great Recession offset most of the decrease in marginal cost due to decreased economic activity.
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Turning to the role of BGG mechanism in model, the BGG mechanism plays a crucial role in explaining the output dynamics in the model. It helps to capture the drop in output at the beginning of the crisis. We find that both components of the risk shock process, anticipated and unanticipated, are important for capturing the fall in output. The intuitive explanation for the importance of anticipated component is straightforward. Anticipating that future uncertainty will increase, banks increase the interest rate on loans more. An increased interest rate depresses investment further, leading to a larger fall in output and, consequently in inflation.
1 However, the fall in inflation is offset by the increase in intermediate materials prices.
This paper is closely related to earlier papers by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013) and Del Negro et al. (2015) (henceforth NGS). Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013) show that 'missing deflation' is a one-off event in response to rising oil prices.
However, in our model, accounting for oil prices alone does not have a significant impact on inflation, as, at around 1%, the share of oil in production is very small. (2011)). NGS suggest that since inflation expectations of the households remained anchored, prices were not revised downwards substantially despite sharp contraction in output.
Another possible explanation for the stability of inflation during the Great Recession is forwarded by Gilchrist et al. (2016) . Gilchrist et al. note that financially constrained firms raise their prices following adverse financial shocks. This is because, since financially constained firms find it difficult to access external finance, they face a higher risk of default. As a result, they raise their prices to maintain internal liquidity even at the cost of a decrease in firm's market share. On the other hand, firms, which are not financially constrained, cut their prices in response to decrease in demand for their products. The explanation in Gilchrist et al. and the one provided in this paper has important implications for firms' mark-ups. In Gilchrist et al., since financially contrained firms raise their prices in order to maintain internal liquidity, mark-ups increase. Whereas, the explanation in this paper implies increas-ing mark-ups for intermediate goods producing firms and decreasing mark-ups for finished goods producing firms.
The implication for finished goods firms' mark-up in this paper is in line with the explanation for missing deflation suggested in Christiano et al. (2015) . Christiano et al. propose that inflation did not fall due to increase in firms' marginal costs.
However, the reason for increasing marginal costs is different in Christiano et al. than in this paper. At the start of the crisis, borrowing costs increased substantially.
Therefore, financially constrained firms, which were previously financing their operating costs (e.g. wage bills) through borrowing, experienced an increase in their financing costs during the crisis. This increased firms' marginal costs and, therefore, kept inflation stable.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model. 
The Model
The framework in this paper builds on the model in SW to allow for input-output In this we follow the work of NGS and CMR. Finally, the modelling of households and the monetary policy are standard New Keynesian.
In the rest of the section, we describe the behaviour of firms followed by the description for the behaviour of households and monetary policy. The model is detrended using a deterministic trend and nominal variables are replaced with their real counterparts. Finally, the model is linearised around the stationary steady state of the detrended variables.
Intermediate and Finished Goods
There is a continuum of firms f ∈ 
The corresponding price index is:
where P t is the general price index, P 
In the finished goods sector, with a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology, firms have a production function of the form:
where Y and Φ is the fixed cost. γ t represents the labour-augmenting deterministic growth rate in the economy. α and µ are the share of capital and intermediate materials in production, respectively. A t is the productivity shock which follows an AR (1) process with parameters ρ a and σ a . E t is a stochastic shock process that is meant to capture changes in production that arise from external factors, such as unusually cold winters and rare disasters. To ensure that E t is distinct from A t and affects the output directly without affecting the marginal cost, it is assumed that E t enters the production function additively. We assume that the shock affects the finished goods sector only. But it has an indirect effect on the intermediate goods sector. An unusually cold winter would cause a disruption in the production of the finished goods which will consequently reduce the demand for intermediate goods as well. 4 The log-linearised version of the production function in equation (7) is:
where e t = ln E t and a t = ln A t . Unlike the finished goods sector, firms in the intermediate sector have labor and capital as the only two factor inputs such that their production function is given by:
where L m t (f ) is a composite of labour input and K m t (f ) is capital services used in the intermediate sector. Log-linearising Equation (9) gives:
Prices in both sectors are set according to Calvo pricing with no ad-hoc partial indexation. Log-linearisation of the aggregate price index in equation (4) 
where κ s is the slope coefficient of the form:
andmc s t is the real marginal cost in the finished goods sector:
ζ p in equation (13) is the Calvo parameter for price stickiness. β is the discount factor. σ c represents the elasticity of intertemporal substitution such that when it is above unity consumption and labor hours are complements. In equation (14) w t is the real wage and r k t is the real rental rate of capital.
The NKPC in the intermediate sector is given by:
where κ m is the slope coefficient of the form:
where ζ (15) is an exogenous shock to intermediate materials prices and follows an AR(2) process of the form in equation (18):
The log-linearised aggregate output is given by
When all of the intermediate materials are used by the finished goods producing firms (i.e.ᾱ = 0), the GDP equals finished sector output. The aggregate marginal cost is
The aggregate labour and capital in logs are given by
In the next subsection, we will describe the financial accelerator mechanism which is identical to that in NGS.
The Financial Accelerator Mechanism and the Risk Shock
The introduction of financial frictions in the model alters the arbitrage equation.
The arbitrage equation between the return on capital and the riskless rate in SW is replaced with an equation for capital returns and an equation for the spread between capital returns and the riskless rate. The equation determining the spread is:
Equation (22) has the SW arbitrage equation as a special case when the parameter, ζ sp,b , associated with the ratio of the value of installed capital to net worth,
, is zero. q k t is the real value of the capital stock.σ w,t is the risk shock andR k t denotes capital return to the entrepreneurs.R k t can also be interpreted as required returns on capital, since entrepreneurs' borrowing cost within the model always equalsR k t , given by:
n t in equation (22) is the net worth of entrepreneurs expressed as:
Following CMR and Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011), we assume the following 13 process for the risk shock:σ
where
After straightforward algebra, the last two equations can be rewritten as:
where 0 < ρσ, ρσ ,n < 1 and σ,t is i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed) and denotes the unanticipated component of risk,σ ω,t . Eq. (27) is an attempt to mimic the effect of the Lehman shock which increased both current and future risk in the economy. To see this more clearly, consider a financial shock, σ,t , in period 't'. σ,t affects the economy in period 't' via two channels. First, σ,t increases risk in period 't' (σ ω,t ). Second, it also increases future risk (σ ω,t+i ) and thus affects the current state of the economy through agents' intertemporal adjustment. σ,t will receive less weight the further agents look into the future. ρ i ω,n is the weight on σ,t for risk in period 't + i .
We call σ,t−j an anticipated component whose value was revealed in t − j. Thus, at time t the realisation of the riskσ ω,t is influenced by the combined impact of both the unanticipated and the anticipated components. Furthermore, as Christiano et al. (2010) argue, such a generalised shock process helps to "tackle the deep-seated misspecification problems in DSGE models." The rest of the model equations are the same as in the SW model and are listed in the Appendix.
3 Estimation Strategy
This section starts with explaining the estimation methodology and macroeconomic data used for estimation purpose. We also present a brief overview of the prior distributions assumed for key parameters. Finally, the calibration of intermediate materials sector and the financial sector parameters is discussed.
We estimate the model in this paper (henceforth SW-BGG-I) for the period from 1981Q1 to 2013Q2. Following Smets and Wouters (2003) , estimation is done using Bayesian estimation techniques.
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We use ten macroeconomic series at the quarterly frequency for the US economy.
Seven of the data series are identical to SW: the log difference of real GDP, real consumption, real investment, real wage, log hours worked, log difference of the GDP deflator and the federal funds rate. Data for quarterly credit spread and 10-year inflation expectations are also included as in NGS. The credit spread is measured by the difference between the interest rate on BAA-rated corporate bonds and the 10 year US government bond rate. The Blue Chip Economic Indicators survey and the Survey of Professional Forecasters are used to obtain data for 10-year inflation expectations. Adding 10-year inflation expectations data is helpful since, as pointed out in Del Negro and Eusepi (2011) and Kiley (2008) 
IntermediateInf lation =γ + 100(p 
wherel, π * = 100(Π * − 1) and R * = 100(β −1 γ σc Π * − 1) are the steady state of the quarterly hours worked, inflation and nominal interest rates, respectively. All the variables are expressed in percent. Table 3 and Table 4 The shock processes in the SW-BGG-I are similar to the SW for identical shocks.
The risk shock follows a process that allows for anticipated signals as explained in equation (25). The price markup shock in the SW is replaced with the two supply side shocks. We interpret a f in equation (15) to equal 60%. We assume that the aggregation is done using a Dixit and Stiglitz aggregator and therefore p equals 1. Table 1 reports the values for the parameters that are fixed in estimation.
Turning to the parameter values for the financial sector, following CMR, we We estimate the two financial sector parameters in equations (22) and (28), ζ sp,b
and SP * , respectively. Priors for the financial sector parameters are set in line with NGS and are given in Table 4 . SP * follows a Gamma distribution with prior mean of 2 and standard deviation of 0.10. ζ sp,b is assumed to follow a Beta distribution with mean of 0.05 and standard deviation of 0.005. The three parameters related to the risk shock are the persistence of the shock process (ρσ), the standard deviation of the shock (σσ) and the parameter on the anticipated components of the risk shock (ρσ ,n ). ρσ has a Beta prior distribution with mean 0.75 and standard deviation 0.15.
σσ has mean 0.05 and standard deviation of 4 with an Inverse Gamma distribution.
ρσ ,n also follows an Inverse Gamma prior distribution with mean 1 and standard deviation 2.
Prior distributions of the remaining parameters in the model are identical to those in SW.
Estimation Results
The estimated values for the structural parameters are reported in Table 3 . Table   3 also includes the prior and posterior standard deviations for the corresponding parameters.
The posterior mean of the price stickiness parameter, ξ p , in the finished goods sector is estimated at 0.78. This suggests an average age of the price contract of 4.5 quarters and is closer to the evidence reported in Klenow and Malin (2011 
Simulation Results
This section focuses on comparing simulation results from the SW-BGG-I model with and without intermediate input-price shocks. In another counterfactual exercise, we also analyse the role of BGG mechanism in driving observed output dynamics.
To do so, we first estimate the model for the period from 1981Q1 to 2013Q2 using Bayesian estimation methods. We obtain estimates for the structural parameters and also the historical values for exogenous shocks over the full sample period. Next, we use this information to simulate the model.
8
In the first counterfactual exercise, we investigate how inflation would have evolved over the period since Great Recession, from 2009Q1 to 2013Q2, had the economy not been hit by intermediate input-price shocks. To do so, we set the intermediate input shock to zero for the period since Great Recession (i.e. and do model simulations. In the second exercise, we investigate how output would have evolved in the absence of the BGG mechanism. We close the BGG mechanism in the simulation exercise for the full sample period by setting ζ sp,b to equal zero and also setting the risk shock to zero (i.e.σ w,1981Q1:2013Q2 =0). We compare the simulation results from both the counterfactual exercises with the actual data.
Moreover, since the simulation period corresponds to the period of zero lower bound on the federal funds rate, we impose zero lower bound on the interest rate throughout our analysis. Figure 3 and Figure 5 plots the simulation results for inflation and output growth along with the actual data over the Great Recession period. The corresponding interest rate dynamics are plotted in figure 2. shocks. It appears that increasing intermediate prices almost completely offset the fall in the marginal costs following the sharp contraction in economic activity. As a consequence, inflation did not fall much during the Great Recession.
We now turn to examine the output dynamics. an important role in explaining output dynamics, especially at the start of Great Recession. To understand the role of the BGG, we also simulate the model without the BGG mechanism. As it is evident from the figure, output falls less without the BGG mechanism. The fall in output growth is only half of the observed fall.
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The intuition behind these results is as follows. Let us first focus on the unanticipated component of the shock process. When the shock hits the economy, uncertainty in the economy increases. This results in banks increasing the interest rate charged on loans to the entrepreneurs. With increased interest rates, entrepreneurs borrow less, leading to a decrease in investment. Consequently, output falls following a contraction in investment.
Adding an anticipated element to the shock process amplifies the fall in output, since the anticipation that future uncertainty will increase leads banks to further increase the interest rate on loans. Increased interest rates depress investment further, leading to a larger fall in output.
Price Shocks and Marginal Costs
It is important to note that price mark-up shocks in the SW framework are meant to capture the changes in energy prices (see, e.g. NGS). However, these shocks These results imply decreasing price mark-ups for finished goods producing firms and increasing price mark-ups for intermediate goods producing firms. The implication for price mark-ups in this paper apears to be contrary to the empirical evidence provided in Gilchrist et al. (2016) and Gilchrist et al. (2015) . They find evidence for increasing price mark-ups during the Great Recession. Montero and Urtasun (2014) also report similar findings for Spain. This is because financially constrained firms find it optimal to increase their prices in order to raise internal liquidity and protect themselves against the risk of default.
However, the implication for the sector-specific mark-ups in this paper do not have to contradict the findings in Gilchrist et al. and Montero and Urtasun (2014) . ducing firms thus forcing them to raise their prices as explained in Gilchrist et al. (2016 Gilchrist et al. ( , 2015 . We leave exploring evidence for this mechanism to future research.
Robustness
The significantly lower compared to that implied by SW and NGS when estimated for the period including Great Recession. However, these estimates are still higher than those reported in micro studies (see Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) (2008) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) . We find our results are robust to assuming an AR(1) process for the intermediate input shock.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have reformulated the standard New Keynesian model to in- an explanation for the "missing deflation" puzzle.
Appendix
The rest of the model is the same as that in the SW model. The Consumption Euler equation is given by:
where c t is consumption, L t is labour supply, R t is nominal riskless interest rate, and π t is inflation. b t is an exogenous shock such that a positive shock increases the required return on assets and increases the cost of capital and reduces the value of capital and investment. b t follows an AR(1) process with parameters ρ b and σ b . h is the habit persistence parameter which makes consumption more persistent for higher values of h and vice versa. Finally, σ c is the relative risk aversion parameter. The consumption process is derived from non-separable utility in labour and consumption.
Variables with * are the respective steady states.
The resource constraint is given by (30) with g t as the exogenous government spending:
Exogenous government spending is also affected by the productivity shock such that: 
where µ t is the investment specific technology shock with parameters ρ µ and σ µ and is also called marginal efficiency of investment shock. β is the discount factor for the households. S is the steady state elasticity of the capital adjustment cost function such that a higher value for it reduces the sensitivity of i t to the real value of existing capital stock, q k t .
Existing capital stock itself evolves according to:
wherek t is the installed capital stock and i * k * is the steady state ratio of investment to installed capital. Since there is a lag in the capital installation, capital services are a function of previously installed capital and the capital utilization decision taken by the entrepreneurs after observing the risk shock:
where capital utilization, u t , is a function of the rental rate of capital:
Wages, w t , are determined by the wage Phillips curves: 
